Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the ESDP: Explaining the EU’s Anti-Piracy Operation

BASIL GERMOND AND MICHAEL E. SMITH

After years of debate and planning, in 2003 the European Union began to launch a variety of foreign security operations under the rubric of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These efforts are intended to complement the European Union’s many other foreign policies conducted by its various institutions. At present the EU has launched no less than 23 ESDP missions of various types, some of which involve the use of military and police forces in various trouble spots around the world: Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and others. In some cases EU forces have engaged in deadly fire-fights with local militia, indicating that these operations have not been passive or merely symbolic shows of force. However, the EU had never attempted an ESDP naval operation, although the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) specifically mentions geographic areas and threats that almost certainly would benefit from an EU naval presence. Indeed, the ESS refers to the growing strategic importance for the EU of regions such as the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and mentions piracy, terrorism, and transnational crime, all of which have maritime aspects. Yet despite various opportunities for taking joint military action to deal with these threats since the ESS was agreed in 2003, the EU chose to play a passive role and let other actors take the lead.

This situation changed quite unexpectedly in November 2008 when the EU decided to launch an ESDP naval mission, Operation Atalanta, or EU NAVFOR, to combat piracy and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa. Atalanta therefore is another critical ‘first’ for the ESDP and the mission offers key lessons regarding the EU’s role in regional and international security. Atalanta has a mandate to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and robbery at sea, including within Somali territorial waters. These goals indicate that the operation goes well beyond the traditional Petersberg-type ESDP tasks that originally helped to justify an independent EU military capability in the 1990s. Petersberg tasks consist of humanitarian or rescue operations, peace operations, and combat missions for crisis resolution, including peacemaking operations. Atalanta, however, exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence on the high seas and within another state’s territorial waters in order to protect the EU’s and its member states’ own interests (maritime trade), in addition to protecting the population of the state in question through the delivery of humanitarian aid. Taken as a whole, Atalanta and the other ESDP missions also increasingly defy the expectations of many sceptics of the ESDP, who have argued for years that the
EU will remain subordinate to NATO as it would never be able to coordinate its own joint military operations. To better understand these changes, and the specific implications for global security policy resulting from the Atalanta mission, this article examines the EU’s naval strategy from a variety of angles. One aspect involves the novelty of the mission itself in light of the general pattern of previous ESDP operations, and the specific emergence of a broad ‘maritime dimension’ to help the EU govern its various external policies. A second aspect involves the dynamics of interest creation and threat perception among the various EU actors responsible for planning and launching ESDP operations. And the third dimension involves the politics of mission construction, specifically in terms of mission command and national contributions. For all three dimensions, we argue that the EU is demonstrating two core attributes not normally associated with highly complex international organizations – especially one created primarily for economic rather than military/security functions. One attribute involves an increasing tendency towards coherent, and even strategic, thinking regarding the EU’s global interests, which now includes a clear security dimension. Indeed, one of the major criticisms of the EU as a global actor has been its inability to coordinate its various resources – which in fact are quite vast – in the service of its common political or security interests. The EU has been attempting to address this problem through institutional reforms and policy entrepreneurship. The second attribute involves the more specific efforts within the ESDP to independently plan and run security missions, as well as to identify possible trouble spots before they become a threat. This capability has been denied to the EU/ESDP for years owing to disputes over the division of labour between the EU and NATO, which partly resulted from American reluctance to support the creation of independent EU military capabilities (that is, the US preference for ‘no duplication’ of NATO’s capabilities, including planning and operational headquarters, within the EU). Military forces cannot act effectively without some degree of forward planning, and the EU’s recent establishment of its own capabilities in this area should increase its profile as a global security actor.


The rapid growth in ESDP operations since the first such mission in 2003 has been one of the most striking developments in contemporary European/EU security affairs. However, most scholarly work on the ESDP has focused on its growth as an institutional framework rather than the actual scope and conduct of ESDP operations. We know, for example, that there are multiple pressures behind the emergence of the ESDP framework since the 1990s. These include the EU’s very ambitious eastern and southern enlargements, which opened new risks and opportunities in the security realm; the rise of ‘soft security’ threats such as terrorism and organized crime; the continuing reduction of internal barriers to the movement of people within the EU thanks to the single European market project, which facilitates the movement of criminals and terrorists once they enter the EU; and the EU’s desire to ‘prove itself’ as a capable political actor, both to its own citizens and to outside...
actors, whether allies or adversaries or potential members/partners. These factors, and the continuing presence of a wide range of security problems on the international stage, provide many windows of opportunity for involvement, and help explain the general rise in demand for EU security cooperation.

However, these factors do not explain the supply of such actions by the EU or any other global actor, a fact which can be appreciated most readily by examining the actual ESDP operations undertaken since 2003. In other words, what function or purpose, as determined by the EU, have these operations actually served? Table 1 summarizes the full range of all such operations initiated between 2003 and 2009.

Space restraints prevent a detailed discussion of each of these missions, yet we can easily summarize why Operation Atalanta represents such an important departure from the typical pattern of ESDP missions established since 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/place</th>
<th>Mission type</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Mission length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. EUPM, Bosnia</td>
<td>Civilian policing</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>2003–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EUFOR, Concordia – YROM</td>
<td>Military peacekeeping</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2003 March–December</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Artemis, DR Congo</td>
<td>Military peacekeeping</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2003 June–September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EUPOL, Proxima FYROM</td>
<td>Civilian policing</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2003–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EUJUST, Themis Georgia</td>
<td>Civilian rule of law</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2004–2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Althea, Bosnia</td>
<td>Military peacekeeping</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>2004–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. EUSEC, DR Congo</td>
<td>Military assistance to DRC government</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. EUPOL COPPS, Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Civilian policing</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. EUBAM, Rafah Palestine</td>
<td>Border monitoring</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. EUJUST, Lex Iraq</td>
<td>Civilian rule of law</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. EUBAM, Moldova Ukraine</td>
<td>Border monitoring</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2005–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. EUFOR, RD Congo</td>
<td>Military peacekeeping</td>
<td>300+</td>
<td>2006 July–November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. EUPOL, Afghanistan</td>
<td>Civilian policing</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. EUPOL, RD Congo</td>
<td>Civilian policing</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2007–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Civilian rule of law</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. EUMM, Georgia</td>
<td>Civilian monitoring of peace agreement</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. EU SSR, Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Civilian security sector reform</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. EUFOR, Tchad</td>
<td>Military bridging operation</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. EU NAVFOR Atalanta, off Somalia</td>
<td>Military counter-piracy operation</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2008–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: EU and non-EU personnel. Figures for personnel also may vary between initial estimates and actual deployment phases depending on the nature and timing of each mission.

The most important consideration is that most of these operations have been only indirectly related to European security. In fact, of all ESDP missions so far (up to Atalanta, that is), only a handful have even touched upon European security interests, and mainly by virtue of their proximity to the EU itself (particularly in the Balkans), not because they involved a direct threat to the interests of EU member states. Many such operations actually have taken place well beyond the EU’s own periphery, and thus cannot be said to have been provoked or inspired by the perception of a common security threat to the EU. Second, most of these operations have not involved military forces but rather have required the use of police and/or other civilian resources, as with the EU’s ‘rule of law’ missions in Georgia and Kosovo. Indeed, the EU is still finding its way regarding the use of various types of military force for the purposes of ESDP missions. Third, of the rare occasions when the ESDP has deployed military force, two such missions (Operations Concordia and Althea in the Balkans) actually involved a mere take-over from NATO missions under the Berlin Plus arrangement. Fourth and finally, the EU’s use of military force has also tended to involve ground forces, with some limited air support (mainly for transport). Atalanta thus clearly represents the EU’s first ESDP operation that directly serves EU member states’ interests (by protecting their maritime trade) compared to operations in the Balkans that have indirectly served member states’ interests by stabilizing neighbouring countries. It is also the EU’s first-ever naval or maritime operation, and one which did not involve or require the use of NATO resources, including its planning capacities or operational headquarters. These facts make it one of the most important ‘firsts’ regarding the evolution of ESDP missions since 2003. It is also one of the largest ESDP operations ever mounted by the EU in terms of personnel. To explain it, however, we need to examine in more detail the general context in which the decision was taken, and the more specific decision-making processes in the ESDP itself. These tasks are undertaken in the rest of this article.

The Emergence of the EU’s Naval and Maritime Dimension (1999–2008)

In order to appreciate the EU’s decision to launch an anti-piracy naval operation, one first has to take into account the development of an EU naval and maritime dimension, which encompasses military and civilian aspects, institutional and geopolitical elements, and intergovernmental and European Community components.

The Emergence of a Maritime Security Strategy

From its beginnings in the late 1990s, the ESDP has always had a naval component, at least on paper. However, initial EU military operations in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Balkans were so limited in scale that the use of naval assets was unnecessary. Even so, the Council of the EU has regularly stressed the importance of European naval forces in the eventuality of higher intensity ESDP operations. As indicated in the EU’s Headline Goal 2010, force projection requires capacities in terms of maritime strategic transport (sealift) and amphibious operations. Some of these resources – air, naval, and land – have been organized into the EU ‘battlegroup concept’, while others can be committed to ESDP operations on a case-by-case
basis. In addition, EU military authorities have highlighted the potential use of ‘naval diplomacy’, or the prepositioning of naval forces for deterrence purposes. The Council eventually mandated an ‘EU Maritime Dimension Study’ (2005–2006), which concluded that naval forces are important as a guarantee of the freedom of the seas, as an element of diplomacy, and as an enabler of the rapid deployment of forces. This study also recommended the creation of a Maritime Rapid Response Mechanism. According to the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which approved the idea in November 2007, this mechanism should be focused on force generation; that is to say, it should provide the EU with enough naval means to undertake various missions.

Thus, although maritime power projection in the past decade has mainly been carried out by NATO (notably in Kosovo and Afghanistan) or by multinational forces (such as the maritime UNIFIL off the Lebanese coast), its importance has clearly been assimilated by the political and military bodies of the EU since the 1999 Helsinki European Council. In addition, the use of naval forces within the EU’s second institutional pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is not restricted to peace operations, but may also encompass naval diplomacy – a broad concept that can easily be variously interpreted. However, until late 2008, and although new ESDP concepts and missions have been developed, the question remained as to when, how, and to what exact purpose these capabilities were going to be employed.

A Comprehensive Approach to Maritime Security and Safety

Despite this apparent lack of foresight or detail regarding the use of naval forces within the realm of the ESDP, other entities within the EU were taking a much broader view of the maritime dimensions of European integration. Problems such as illegal immigration, arms trafficking, drug smuggling, terrorism, piracy and robbery at sea, overexploitation of sea resources, and marine pollution were increasingly being considered by the EU as important risks or threats. Moreover, the EU also takes into account the importance of the sea in terms of energy security, ‘as a source of oil and gas, and an enabler of energy transportation’. Taken together, these important concerns clearly pointed to a need for much greater coherence, and forward-looking or strategic thinking, across the EU’s many policy domains, internal and external. As always, this problem (that is, of policy incoherence or fragmentation) required better coordination across the EU’s three main institutional pillars. For example, the EU copes with sea-borne/sea-based transnational threats, as well as with marine environment degradation and fisheries protection, through its first pillar (the European Community, or EC) and its third pillar (Police and Judicial Affairs). The second pillar (CFSP/ESDP) is also involved, notably concerning counter-terrorism, or simply when using or coordinating military assets, as in the case of counter-piracy. Moreover, various EU specialized agencies assume some authority over maritime affairs: the Community Fisheries Control Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, FRONTEX, the European Defence Agency (naval procurement), the European Environmental Agency (marine environment protection), and the European Space Agency (maritime surveillance).
In order to promote coherence and good governance regarding the EU’s maritime interests, the EU produced an ‘Integrated Maritime Policy’ (IMP) (also known as the ‘Blue Book’) in October 2007. The rationale behind this policy is to integrate horizontally the sector-based policies and activities regarding maritime affairs, ‘based on the clear recognition that all matters relating to Europe’s oceans and seas are interlinked, and that sea-related policies must develop in a joined-up way if we are to reap the desired results’. Based on the understanding that maritime issues are to be dealt with comprehensively, the aims of this policy are very ambitious: ‘An Integrated Maritime Policy will enhance Europe’s capacity to face the challenges of globalisation and competitiveness, climate change, degradation of the marine environment, maritime safety and security, and energy security and sustainability’. However, although the IMP tends to stress economic rather than security issues, despite the efforts of different stakeholders during the consultation process that produced it, the EU has always implicitly recognized a fundamental link between its economic, political, and security objectives. In the case of the IMP, we find environmental security issues, such as fisheries protection and anti-pollution activities, as well as the struggle against illegal immigration and criminal activities at sea, including piracy. Among the cross-sector tools identified by the IMP, particular emphasis is placed on maritime surveillance; it involves ‘safety of navigation, marine pollution, law enforcement, and overall security’. As the challenges are mostly transnational in nature, maritime surveillance requires coordination between the different EU bodies involved in maritime affairs, among EU member states, and between member states and the EU.

The IMP was a critical step on the path to Atalanta. It means that the EU conceives of ‘maritime affairs’ in an increasingly comprehensive and coherent way. The EU’s maritime interests are not restricted to power and force projection, but encompass many different aspects, such as illegal immigration, fisheries protection, maritime safety, energy security, and so on. Thus, although the 2003 ESS did not directly emphasize it, the EU now implicitly asserts the importance of the sea for ‘European security’ in the broadest sense of the term: that is, supranational, transnational, national, societal, human, and environmental security. This reflects both the evolution of the concept of security in the post-Cold War era and the changing practice by EU member states, originating in the demise of the Soviet threat and the evolution of the perception of risks and threats by various actors.

Finally, the maritime dimension is linked to the growing importance of the frontier zone between the EU and the outer world. Its strategic depth should contribute to the security of the Union, but as the first frontline, this zone must also be secured itself. Indeed, it is arguable that many of the ‘everyday’ threats facing the EU as defined earlier are sea-borne or sea-based rather than land-based, mainly in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, or even the Middle East. For example, the ESS implicitly refers to the EU’s periphery, notably the maritime frontiers, as the theatre for the EU’s projection of security: ‘with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad […]. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed.’ In fact, and except for the eastern and Balkan frontiers, the states neighbouring the EU are located far beyond member states’
own territorial waters, notably ‘on the borders of the Mediterranean’. In other words, paraphrasing British Admiral Philip Colomb, who, at the end of the 19th century, argued that the ‘British frontier is the enemy’s coast’, one could say that the extreme limit of the EU security frontier is any coast of a state where current threats originate, whether in the form of illegal immigration from North Africa, drugs/arms smuggling in the Balkans, or piracy off the Somali coast. These views regarding the importance of maritime issues in EU foreign policy are also reflected in the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy over the past several years, which helps to define and manage relations with the EU’s entire periphery, as well as in the more recent Union for the Mediterranean initiative.

In short, the EU’s maritime frontiers are hybrid spaces, which legally are situated outside of the EU, but which functionally lie inside its strategic zone of interest, and whose stability is essential. They therefore represent an emerging public space that the Europeans can use in order to project security outside, but also a space that has to be secured and protected against transnational threats, of which piracy has now become significant.

The EU and the Threat of Piracy

However, recognizing the existence of various general threats to Europe’s maritime security and organizing a collective EU military response to counter a specific threat are two separate things. In this section we explain how one process encouraged the other, resulting in the EU’s decision to launch EU NAVFOR, which is covered in the next section.

Piracy and EU Threat Perception

Piracy is one of several transnational criminal activities described as a threat by the EU and its member states, and pirates are linked to wider criminal networks and organizations which are not restricted to illegal activities at sea. Pirates have been active in the waters off Somalia for more than a decade as the civil war in that state has dragged on, but 2008 saw four major developments: the number of attacks increased dramatically (by 75 per cent) in a very short time (more than 130 in 2008 alone); pirates began to take hostages and ask for ransoms rather than just seize cargoes; the types of targets evolved towards ‘high sides’ ships (such as oil tankers) that were believed to be safe until very recently; and the operational range (from the coast) of pirates’ raids increased to 500nm (far beyond Somalia’s 12nm territorial waters and its 200nm Exclusive Economic Zone) thanks in part to the pirates’ use of well-armed ‘mother ships’ to launch raids on the high seas. These trends made Somalia the new piracy capital of the world, displacing Indonesia. Thus, for Europeans, as for many states whose trade and energy imports transit through the area (notably China, India, Japan, and Russia), piracy in 2008 clearly exceeded the level of a marginal annoyance and reached the level of a major threat off the Somali coasts, both on the Eastern coast and in the Gulf of Aden. For the first nine months of 2008 alone, the International Maritime Bureau reported 63 cases of piracy and robbery at sea in this area, and at least 200 people and 13...
vessels were being held hostage by around five to ten major Somali pirate gangs, with as many as 1,000 members. This activity has resulted in major cargo losses, and millions of dollars have been paid as ransoms. Beyond these direct financial costs, piracy represents a threat to the EU and its member states along several dimensions.

First, piracy constitutes a threat to EU citizens (yachters and sailors) who are subject to kidnapping and ransoming. Public authority is thus responsible for assuring the security of these citizens, or at least, legally speaking, of the ships flying their flag. As the British Foreign Secretary David Miliband notes, normal national policy involving hijackers (terrorists or pirates) is to pay no ransom. However, although ransoms are generally paid to pirates by shipping companies, states are often involved in the transactions. In any case, as piracy is now highly publicized by the media, states must demonstrate that they are doing something to prevent further attacks or to rescue kidnapped citizens. In this sense, France has been extremely proactive. Indeed, after the hijacking of the French yacht Le Ponant in April 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy did not hesitate to authorize French Special Forces to chase the pirates on land. In September 2008, he further authorized the use of deadly force to rescue two kidnapped French yachters; the operation resulted in the death of one pirate. As the number of raids has been increasing, prevention and deterrence have appeared to be better options than reacting to attacks (rescue operations, payments, and so on).

Second, pirate raids clearly harm maritime trade, which is obviously damaging to the European (and world) economy, as about 20 per cent of global trade passes through the Gulf of Aden. Beyond the ransoms that may be paid in case of hijacking, piracy creates delays, not only for attacked ships, but also for all ships that have to divert to avoid certain areas. Certain shipping companies have even decided to favour the Cape of Good Hope route, which imposes extra costs in a period when sea cargo is already expensive. Upstream, the cost of insurance for shipping companies increases, and certain operators have even had to make special extra payments to sailors when they transit through the ‘pirates’ area. In just one year, for example, insurance costs to ship cargo through the Gulf of Aden soared from US$900 to US$9,000, a huge economic drain considering that upwards of 16,000 ships per year transit the area. These extra costs, totalling hundreds of millions of dollars, will obviously pass on to other firms and consumers. Given the current world financial crisis and the foreseen long-term economic recession, this goes far beyond the level of annoyance and requires firm action. Moreover, by November 2008, the secretary-general of the European Community Ship-owners Association (ECSA), which claims to speak for 41 per cent of the global merchant fleet, was explicitly calling on EU member states to take more forceful action against piracy off Somalia. The ECSA wanted not only more escorts but actual military repression of piracy operations.

Third, piracy at the Horn of Africa constitutes a threat in terms of energy security for Europeans. Indeed, a great share of the EU’s oil imports transit through this area, as six million barrels a day – more than 12 per cent of global oil transport – are shipped through the Gulf of Aden, worth about several hundred million dollars a day depending on oil prices. The extremely bold hijacking of the Saudi supertanker
** Sirius Star in November 2008 demonstrated that even these types of ships (with high sides) are no longer secure. Energy security implies more than thinking about the economic repercussions of piracy, however; it also requires securing the EU with enough energy supplies to fulfil its needs. Potential disruption of energy supplies is thus considered as a core security threat that could endanger EU member states’ and the EU’s core interests. Western countries have been making major efforts to secure oil transport through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz; thus they cannot tolerate insecurity further south, as it could be equally damaging to their energy security.**

Fourth, due to the location of the pirates’ activities and bases, some say that there could be a risk that pirates develop links with terrorist groups. They are already linked to warlords and militias in Somalia and Yemen; some groups have even been labelled as terrorist organizations by the US, such as the Al-Shabaab group in Somalia. As long as pirates’ attacks and gains are increasing, the risk exists that terrorists will become progressively more interested in pirates, who can provide them with ships and cargo. Although such direct links are so far unproven, the potential clearly exists, especially after one pirate gang, in September 2008, captured a Ukrainian freighter, the *MV Faina*, which was loaded with military hardware, including grenade launchers, 33 Russian-made tanks, and ammunition. The pirates demanded a ransom of US$20 million and the attack prompted an immediate response by ships of the US Fifth Fleet in the region. Given this type of attack, the ongoing civil war in Somalia, and the extensive resources devoted by Europeans to counter-terrorism, this potential piracy–terrorist–insurgency link must be taken into consideration when formulating a counter-piracy strategy.

**Fifth, piracy constitutes a risk to the marine environment. Indeed, the hijacking of oil and chemical tankers by pirates using heavy machine guns and even rocket-propelled grenade launchers may well cause the hulls of tankers to crack, releasing dangerous chemicals into the environment. Given the terrible effects of tankers’ accidents (such as the *Erika* in 1999 or the *Prestige* in 2002), one can only fear such accidental effects of deliberate attacks without even mentioning the potential use by terrorists of hijacked tankers to create massive pollution.**

**Sixth and finally, piracy harms Somalia itself, or at least the Somali population. The delivery of UN humanitarian assistance is vital for millions of Somalis who chronically suffer from food shortages and totally depend on the World Food Programme. Pirate raids clearly have constituted a real threat, as any interference in food delivery could make the humanitarian disaster in Somalia much worse that it already is. Moreover, the money gained as well as the food or arms stolen by pirates are often, in one way or another, transferred to warlords. Piracy thus reflects and perpetuates the state of chaos and civil war in Somalia. Since 2007, different actors, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and NATO (in Operation Allied Provider) have escorted UN/World Food Programme ships, until EU NAVFOR took over this task in December 2008. If a long-term settlement of the internal situation of Somalia is not on the European agendas (financially too costly, politically too risky, and militarily too dangerous), the securing of the delivery of humanitarian aid against pirates and similar threats constitutes a reasonable stopgap measure.**
The Antecedents of Atalanta

All of these issues linked to piracy off Somalia directly correspond to the threats described by the ESS and the IMP, which in turn inspire a call for action: the security of EU citizens, the protection of the EU’s economy, energy security, terrorism, marine pollution, and the instability/weakness of states that impact European interests. However, while these factors may justify an EU operation, they are not enough to explain the EU’s actual decision to launch such an operation, especially given the other potential options: unilateral or joint national operations, a UN operation, or a NATO operation. The critical link between these two processes – threat perception and ESDP mission creation – involves the limited European efforts to coordinate the naval operations of its own member states during 2008.

This effort began with a general recognition among all of the European parties with an interest in stopping piracy that the collapse of the Somali state and the chaotic situation ashore provide pirates with rear bases or safe havens to support their raids; indeed, they are largely tolerated, if not supported, by warlords. Thus, vanquishing piracy off Somali coasts depends to a large degree on an end to the chaos ashore. The remedy would consist in providing Somalia with an effective government able to exercise the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its territory. As another military intervention in Somalia is clearly not on the American or European agendas, the only realistic solution consists of escorting certain ships (those with high value and/or dangerous cargo) and in monitoring the area to deter pirates and to react in case of attacks. Due to the width of the area subject to piracy (Somalia’s and Kenya’s eastern coasts, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden), any effective such mission would require numerous ships. Thus, the Europeans began to make national contributions in 2001 to multilateral efforts to monitor and secure the sea in this area within the naval component of US-led operation Enduring Freedom, including Task Force (TF) 151, which operates in the Strait of Hormuz, and TF 150, which operates at the Horn of Africa. Following the dramatic increase in the number of raids in 2007 and 2008, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions between May and December 2008 in order to manage this problem. Resolution 1816 authorizes states to use ‘within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’, while Resolution 1846 extended these provisions 12 more months. In the meantime, various states, including Europeans, sent naval units in the region to deter pirates as well as to signify their support to the ships flying their flag. Between October and December 2008, NATO sent units from the NATO Standing Maritime Group (NSMG) 2 to protect ships carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia (operation Allied Provider).

For its part, the Council of the EU began to pay attention to this threat in the spring of 2008, and expressed strong concerns about piracy. In September 2008, it established ‘a coordination cell in Brussels with the task of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some (EU) Member States off the Somali coast [EU NAVCO]’. Improving coordination between international
political and economic affairs is exactly something the EU has a comparative advantage in relative to other regional international organizations such as NATO, thanks to its experience and the formulation of its IMP. Thus, the EU NAVCO initiative launched in September 2008 was undoubtedly a useful mechanism, as the primary aim was to coordinate all the actors working against piracy at the Horn of Africa. However, the subsequent EU NAVFOR (in fact already envisaged in the Council’s decision to create EU NAVCO) is an additional naval force operating in a theatre where there are certainly not enough units but already enough structures. Thus, it seems that the need to coordinate actors does not explain by itself the EU’s decision to launch a military operation of its own. For this we must take a closer look at the involvement and interests of specific EU member states.

EU Member States and the ESDP Decision-Making Process

Responding to the above-mentioned problems that result from the increase of piracy off Somali coasts is certainly in member states’ interests. However, it does not explain the decision to resort to the ESDP option rather than simply maintain a coordinated national response through EU NAVCO. Instead, the advocates of an ESDP naval mission framed this option as not just a measured response to a known threat, but also as an opportunity to increase the EU’s scope of action and spread European/EU values. This is illustrated by the debate that took place at the European Parliament (EP) after the creation of EU NAVCO, but before the Council’s formal decision to launch EU NAVFOR. Although the EP does not have a formal veto over ESDP operations, it can discuss them and potentially raise or lower the political costs of sustaining such a mission. In the case of EU NAVFOR, the mission was publicly supported by several Members of the EP (MEPs) after Dominique Bussereau, the French President-in-Office of the Council, stated that the EU is ‘not only showing its determination to act, but also affirming its position as a prime mover on the international scene in the fight against piracy’. For example, Rosa Miguélez Ramos, a Spanish MEP, echoed this view, stating that an EU option would be ‘an important sign of visibility for Europe’; similarly, for Philippe Morillon, a French MEP (and former commander of the UN forces in Bosnia), EU NAVFOR would be ‘a chance for the European Union to use the means to defend its values and interests’. Outside the EP, Antonio Tajani, Vice-President of the Commission, argued that ‘it is a matter of defending not just the interests but also the values of the European Union’. As with previous ESDP missions, then, the EU decision to launch Atalanta was clearly motivated by common perceptions of not just the interests but also the grandeur of the EU and the affirmation of its values. Even so, all ESDP operations – particularly those with a military component – also require the explicit endorsement of one or more of the EU’s major member states, so it is also necessary to examine their role in putting the EU’s general ideals into actual practice.

France responded quickly and robustly after the French yacht Le Ponant was hijacked in April 2008, launching a commando raid on land to capture the pirates after the ransom was paid and the hostages liberated. This event was highly
publicized by the media and served as a trigger in the fight against piracy in the Somali waters. France again took the lead of the multilateral anti-piracy crusade, pushing for the UN Security Council to pass a resolution (No. 1816) authorizing operations within Somali waters, and advocating the creation of an international anti-piracy force. President Sarkozy, as holder of the rotating EU presidency between July and December 2008, also employed the traditional French strategy of using the EU to foster France’s rank (and eventually France’s role) on the world stage. Following also the now-traditional French desire to strengthen the ESDP, Sarkozy was naturally the first major official advocate of an EU naval operation, as it would bolster his anti-piracy policy and his desire to strengthen the ESDP by giving it a true naval dimension. Since the end of the Cold War, France has traditionally been a strong advocate of naval cooperation with European partners outside NATO, notably with the Force Navale France–Allemande (French–German naval force – or FNFA) and the EUROMARFOR.51 Thus, according to French defence Minister Hervé Morin, the EU naval operation is ‘a “marvellous symbol” of moves towards a Euro-military and defence policy’.52

France, however, would still need allies among the other major EU member states to launch an actual ESDP operation, rather than merely a French-led European effort, and Germany was an obvious partner. Indeed, increased participation in naval operations far away from Germany’s territorial waters represents one of the most striking shifts of German security and defence policy in the 21st century. Recent doctrinal documents, notably the 2003 Zielvereinbarung für die Deutsche Marine,53 place a great emphasis on the transition from an ‘escort’ navy to an ‘interventionist’ one: ‘Beyond the traditional assets of the Navy in coastal waters, adjacent waters, and the high seas (the Escort Navy), the capacity is developing to carry out in priority enduring operations very remote from the adjacent waters within the framework of various threats scenarios (the Expeditionary Navy)’.54 Consequently, the German Navy (officially renamed in 2005 as the Deutsche Marine instead of the Bundesmarine) has participated in various ‘out of area’ (that is, out of Europe) operations, notably the anti-terrorist operations Enduring Freedom at the Horn of Africa and Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean (even assuming the command of a task force), as well as the naval component of the UN force off the coast of Lebanon that it also commanded in 2006.

In addition, Germany is an active member of the FNFA, which demonstrates Berlin’s clear acceptance of European naval cooperation conceived outside NATO. This is also another major advance of the German position since the 1990s regarding ‘out of area’ multilateral military operations, whether conducted by NATO, the EU, or on a case-by-case basis.55 However, German public opinion has increasingly criticized Germany’s naval operations (notably regarding the US-led Enduring Freedom), considering them as not very useful for German security interests and, thus, as primarily a means to please the US. As is often the case, German public opinion also considers purely NATO operations (such as Active Endeavour) to be under the US aegis.56 For example, the German Parliament faced considerable public opposition when it endorsed in October 2008 an increase in Germany’s participation in NATO’s operation in Afghanistan. Facing the challenge of piracy in an
adjacent region, the German government clearly felt a domestic political preference for an EU option rather than yet another controversial NATO or US-led operation.\textsuperscript{57}

Rather than Germany, then, the real problem in the EU was the UK, which has been reluctant to let the EU become more competent in naval matters, and has tended to take a somewhat passive role regarding leadership on ESDP military missions compared to other EU states.\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, NATO has been the only competent actor in naval operations so far, and it has proved to be very flexible and versatile in past years, especially concerning anti-terrorist operations.\textsuperscript{59} According to NATO, operation Allied Provider was another ‘clear demonstration of Alliance flexibility, notably in the maritime field, and its ability to meet the variety of challenges posed in today’s security environment’.\textsuperscript{60} Seemingly viewing the NATO–ESDP relationship as a zero-sum game, the British government has tended to believe that a new ESDP competence in naval matters would automatically undermine NATO’s capacities. More strident (though unofficial) UK views on the topic were reflected in comments by British Conservative MEP Geoffrey van Orden, who stated that NATO would have been more effective for an anti-piracy operation and that ‘the EU is desperate to find military operations that it can stick its flag on in order to give credibility to its defence pretensions’.\textsuperscript{61} However, as a major naval power in its own right, the UK still has to act against piracy to maintain its own credibility on the high seas. The UK would certainly have preferred to use NATO, but NATO was already becoming overstretched elsewhere (notably in Afghanistan, and, in naval terms too, in monitoring potential terrorist activities at sea).

Thus, although operation Atalanta may have been a sub-optimal option in British eyes, it was still preferable to doing nothing or – even worse – allowing the French to take the lead in a high-profile multilateral anti-piracy operation that clearly affected British shipping interests. Indeed, according to the EU’s principle of subsidiarity, advocated by the UK and the US in the period of creation of the ESDP (1999), having an effective ESDP may well be in their interests when the US or NATO are not willing to intervene (or are busy elsewhere). Anti-piracy cooperation could thus be delegated to the EU, allowing NATO to focus on other (supposedly more important) business, namely, terrorism. The UK’s role in the operation was enhanced further when the EU agreed that Atalanta would be commanded by a British rear admiral and that the EU’s Operational Headquarters for the mission would be located at Northwood in the UK. Additional contributions of aircrafts, ships, and personnel were made initially by France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Sweden (see Table 2); in 2009 Norway (a non-EU member state) agreed to send one frigate to the mission and Bulgaria offered two soldiers. These contributions totalled over a dozen vessels devoted to a single goal: counter-piracy. In the end, David Miliband could argue that ‘Britain had a leading role in the European effort to tackle piracy’ even though the entire effort was engineered by France.\textsuperscript{62}

Moreover, one can imagine that the simple fact that this operation was a naval one, a longstanding area of British competence and tradition, was the key element that made it possible for the British government (\textit{vis-à-vis} its public opinion) to take command of an ESDP operation for the first time. This decision – which effectively bridged US, UK, French, and German preferences – to let the EU patrol the
Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden thus freed the US-led TF 150 to focus on other problems, notably its original priority: the fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{63} It also facilitated NATO’s own offer to deploy a ‘follow-up anti-piracy mission to assist the EU ships’ in spring 2009.\textsuperscript{64} Finally, an EU-led operation also sends a signal to Somalia, to other states in the region, and to European citizens that even though the EU takes piracy seriously enough to mount a naval operation against it, Europe (unlike the US or NATO) would not even consider a more offensive or aggressive operation against Somalia itself to deal with the underlying problem: state failure.

That said, solving the issue of piracy cannot be done by targeting piracy at sea alone, which is precisely why Operation Atalanta is part of a wider EU strategy towards Somalia. The EU’s comprehensive approach to the problem thus has political, economic, security and humanitarian dimensions. For example, ongoing initiatives include the EU’s support to the Djibouti peace process, to the African Union military mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and to Somalia’s security sector reforms. In parallel, the EU is also ‘developing a comprehensive response to piracy in the Gulf region encompassing the legal framework, institutional arrangements and operational measures such as strengthening information exchange capability. The programme (costing €14–18 million) essentially concerns coastal states along the main maritime routes from the Gulf of Aden to the Straits of Malacca and is due to start in 2010’.\textsuperscript{65}

Moreover, EU NAVFOR is not the only actor currently involved in the fight against piracy off Somalia. Two US-led tasks forces are active in the waters at the Horn of Africa: TF 150 (whose primary aim is to fight terrorism at sea) and TF 151 (which, since January 2009, has been specifically engaged in counter-piracy operations). Since March 2009, NATO has engaged one of its standing maritime groups (SNMG 1 then 2) within Operation Allied Protector. Along with the EU, NATO, and the US, various other states have joined the counter-piracy effort, including China, Egypt, India, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia,

### Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participating states</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2 frigates, 1 corvette, 1 patrol boat</td>
<td>1 maritime patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2 frigates, 1 auxiliary (oil tanker)</td>
<td>1 maritime patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1 frigate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1 frigate, 1 auxiliary (oil tanker)</td>
<td>1 maritime patrol aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3 corvettes</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

and Turkey. Finally, institutional actors such as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the UN are involved, through risk analyses and maritime awareness, as well as at the political and legal levels. The Atalanta Operation Headquarters coordinates with all of these actors through a range of mechanisms, which may lay the groundwork for future EU maritime security operations. That said, the current multilateral naval structure, bringing together a network of national naval forces, naval coalitions, and institutional actors, is still very complicated, and active leadership must be exercised to gradually increase the efficiency of the operational activities without unnecessary duplication of effort.

Conclusion

The gradual development of a comprehensive maritime dimension of European security, including a recognition of the importance of the EU’s maritime frontiers, the unprecedented rise of piracy off Somalia, and a mixture of EU member states’ domestic and foreign interests, helps explain the EU’s first ESDP naval operation. Specifically, France’s desire to strengthen the ESDP, Britain’s reluctance to let France claim sole credit for any European naval operation, Germany’s desire to balance its domestic political concerns with its international obligations, and the preference of a variety of actors for an EU rather than a NATO/UN operation all play critical roles in understanding why the EU took its decision to launch Atalanta, which is not a French or a British operation under the EU flag, but a true multilateral European naval deployment. However, it appears that all major actors within the EU – especially the ‘big three’ – also shared a desire to respond to a common security threat and enhance the EU’s global role once the specifics were worked out. Even the British have come closer to the idea of a more robust and independent EU security policy by agreeing to take operational command of its first ESDP military operation.

Yet what do these general interests, and this specific operation, reveal about the evolution of the ESDP’s objectives, and more generally about EU’s geopolitical ambitions? From a tactical perspective, and like other major global actors, the EU clearly recognizes the interdependent nature of post-Cold War security affairs. However, most ESDP operations so far have served EU security interests in only an indirect fashion by contributing to the stability of the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, particularly in the east and south. Other ESDP operations, as in Africa and Asia, have played an even lesser role in their contribution to EU security interests. Operation Atalanta breaks this trend as not only the first-ever EU naval operation, but also as the first-ever EU operation to deploy military forces abroad under the EU flag in order to defend EU member states’ interests both directly (the security of EU maritime trade) and indirectly (stabilizing non-EU countries). Thus, Atalanta illustrates that the ESDP is an instrument that can serve member states’ interests (and the EU’s interests) and not only act as a provider of stability and humanitarian aid to vulnerable populations. The difference may appear small, but this evolution in the nature of actual ESDP missions is nevertheless quite tangible and may pave the way towards similar missions more directly linked to EU member states’ interests.
Hence, increasing the EU’s visibility, spreading EU values, and increasing the EU’s role on the world stage may become more representative of EU member states’ national interests, and vice-versa. In that sense, the leading role played by the UK in operation Atalanta, after initially questioning the EU’s security interest in anti-piracy, is highly instructive.

On a strategic level, operation Atalanta shows how the ESDP can serve broader EU geopolitical objectives and ambitions, which extend far beyond the EU’s external borders and neighbouring areas and are strongly linked to the sea. The EU possesses many attributes of a major sea power, such as its geographical location (at the end of the European peninsula, which itself constitutes the far end of the Eurasian land-mass), its maritime-dependent economic activities (trade, energy, fisheries, tourism), its maritime-related security interests, and its member states’ naval resources (second to none but the US Navy). Until Atalanta, however, its capacities for power projection at sea were far more latent than tangible. To deploy this power for the first time, the EU combined a comprehensive statement of its interests – its maritime vision – with its interpretation, shared by other major actors, of the growing threat of piracy. This combination of interest definition, threat perception, and military power projection has been lacking in every single ESDP operation until Atlanta. Moreover, given the EU’s demonstrable concern with legal precedents to justify its foreign/security policy decisions, Atalanta has paved the way for similar operations to defend the EU’s maritime frontiers, which are as extensive as any other major power in the system, and which the EU increasingly feels it must control, and with military force if necessary – again, an unprecedented combination of interests backed up by action relative to previous ESDP missions. In other words, the defence of European security interests outside the EU’s territory now requires a prioritization of the maritime zones bordering Europe and well beyond it (namely, major shipping lanes, sea lines of communication, undersea economic resources, etc.). This fact in turn requires greater geopolitical ambitions on the part of the EU.

However, the competitive nature of world politics means that one actor’s geopolitical ambitions often enter in conflict with those of other actors. The Horn of Africa, as a gateway to the Gulf and further east to Asia, is strategically important for many powers, such as China, India, Russia, and the US. Over the past decade, all of these states have increased their presence and leverage in the region for a variety of reasons. Obviously, EU member states cannot rely upon the US or upon their individual resources to secure their interests in this vast turbulent region of the world; nor can they expect other multilateral organizations (particularly the UN and NATO) to support European objectives. Consequently, EU members increasingly realize they have to act through the EU. This is precisely what they did in giving the EU a clear naval dimension, linked to its maritime interests, following the dramatic 2008 increase in piracy attacks. To fulfil its ambitions, the EU will therefore become increasingly involved in strategically important regions of the world and be ready to respond in case of crises. We can also see a potential for the EU to encourage multilateral security cooperation with non-EU member states, as China, India, Japan, and Russia decided to contribute to the fight against piracy following the EU’s decision to deploy a naval force off Somalia and the UN Security Council’s authorization to
operate within Somalia’s territorial waters. Thanks to this joint effort, other states may be more willing to respond to EU, rather than US, leadership in such situations.

In sum, then, the decision to launch an anti-piracy operation can be linked to the Europeans’ willingness to affirm the EU’s geopolitical objectives regarding its maritime frontiers on the Mediterranean area and the Indian Ocean. And although this mission is too recent to conclusively evaluate its operational success, it has shown clear signs of effectiveness: EU NAVFOR ships have successfully deterred attacks and arrested a number of pirates, while other Atalanta ships have protected many shipments by the World Food Programme. Moreover, the mere launch of Atalanta, the support given by non-EU actors to the mission, the early stages of the mission, and the EU’s claims regarding its right and its duty to act against piracy at the Horn of Africa, all suggest the EU may become a stronger and more proactive player in one of the most tumultuous regions of the world; one where the EU’s interests, and involvement, are only likely to grow in the foreseeable future.

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NOTES

3. Defined in 1992 by the Western European Union (WEU), these missions are now included in article 17 of the Treaty on the EU (Nice Treaty).

8. Personal interviews with EU Military Staff (EUMS) officials, Brussels, November 2007, June 2008, April 2009, and June 2009. Most of the initial 100+ EUMS officials hired by the EU after 1999 have served at NATO, as did several officials interviewed for this article. These individuals are especially well positioned to compare the workings and mindsets of each institution.


10. Briefly, the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement allows for ‘assured access’ to NATO planning capabilities, a ‘presumption of availability’ to the EU of NATO assets, and NATO European command support for EU-led operations. Berlin Plus discussions began in June 1996 but were not completed (and thus made operational) until December 2002.


13. A battlegroup is a form of rapid-response capacity-building, each one consisting of around 1,500 troops reinforced with combat support elements, including relevant air and naval capabilities, which can be launched on the ground within ten days after the EU decides to act. See Lt Col. Ron Hamelink, ‘The Battlegroups Concept: Giving the EU a Concrete “Military” Face’, *EuroFuture* (Winter 2005), pp. 8–11; and Gustav Lindstrom, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, Chaillot Paper No. 97 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2007).

14. Rear Admiral Jan van der Burg, ‘Naval Components within the EU’, Seminar on Europe’s maritime frontiers, Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), Lisbon, 18 September 2007, p. 3.


17. Although anti-piracy missions could well have been envisaged, as the 2003 ESS mentioned piracy as a potential threat. Council of the EU, *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (note 1), p. 5.


20. The European agency responsible for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states. Among other tasks, FRONTEX coordinates EU member states’ police operations to monitor and combat illegal immigration at sea.


27. Ibid., p. 8.


33. International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Service, IMB, available at http://www.icc-ccs.org. Other risky zones listed by the IMB are located in the waters near China, Indonesia, the Gulf of Guinea, and in the vicinity of some Brazilian ports.


41. Concerning the alleged link between pirates and terrorists in the Strait of Malacca, see Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security (RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 2008).


44. As one observer notes, ‘Pirates cannot function, and piracy could never have survived unless there were sympathizers, protectors and customers on the shore ready, willing and able to provide sanctuary’. Donald J. Puchala, ‘Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 6–7.


51. Created in 1995 with France, Italy and Spain (and since 1998 Portugal as well), EUROMARFOR is a multinational on-call naval force. It consists of pre-designated units that could be activated within a few days, particularly for crisis management missions as defined by the Petersberg declaration. Its perimeter of action seems to correspond, for the moment, to the Mediterranean region (enlarged to the Horn of Africa) even if this does not constitute the official position. The FNFA works in a similar way.


56. EUMS officials, even those who have served in both NATO and EU institutions, also attest to a common perception that NATO is basically a tool of US interests, and thus may not be accepted in certain parts of the world (particularly the Middle East). As one such official put it, the EU, not NATO, is ‘the acceptable face of Europe’. Personal interviews with EUMS officials, Brussels, November 2007, June 2008, April 2009, and June 2009.

57. It is also arguable that other states might prefer an EU-led operation to a NATO-led one, particularly as all EU operations are typically endorsed by the UN. India, for example, supports the idea of UN-authorized naval missions, as it traditionally avoids participation in coalition operations (except within the UN), and especially not a coalition dominated by the US (through NATO or otherwise), as it would create problems in India’s internal politics. China and Russia have the same attitude. See Atul Aneja, ‘India Weighs Counter-Piracy Options in Somalia’, *The Hindu*, 21 November 2008.


59. Since the end of the Cold War, the NATO standing maritime groups have been often and efficiently engaged in various operations ranging from embargos to counter-terrorism.


61. Quoted by Waterfield, ‘UK to Lead EU Anti-Piracy Force’ (note 52). However, NATO did consider an operation in Somalia (as well as an intervention in the 2006 Israeli–Lebanon war) but abandoned both efforts because it was felt that NATO forces would not be accepted. Personal interview with an EUMS official, Brussels, November 2007.


66. Ibid., p. 9.


68. This conclusion would seem to satisfy the basic conditions posited by Anthony King regarding the minimal requirements for a more robust ESDP policy. However, where King also argues that the ‘future of European security’ may lie in a ‘transformed NATO’, we argue precisely the opposite: the future of the ESDP lies in its independence from NATO, owing not only to the underlying rationales and institutional histories of each organization but also to the perceptions of outsiders who interact with those organizations, as noted in this article. See King, ‘The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy’ (note 50), pp. 52–3.


71. In fact, China’s decision to contribute to the fight was the first time in five centuries that Chinese naval forces were sent beyond its territorial waters to defend Chinese interests; China also admitted for the first time that it was seriously considering building its first aircraft carrier. Leo Lewis, ‘Beijing Ends 500 Years of Tradition as it Sends the Navy out to Attack Pirates’, *The Times*, 27 December 2008, p. 43.